Abstract. Even if the application developers produce software in accordance with the customer requirements, they cannot guarantee that the software will behave in a safe way during the lifetime of the software. We define a system as safe if the risks related to its use are judged to be acceptable [1] . Safety must not be confused with security which broadly is defined as keeping the system unavailable for people who should not be able to access it. In this paper we introduce the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique into the software development process to improve the safety of business-critical software. In a business environment this means that the system does not behave in such a way that it causes the customer or his users to lose money or important information. We will use the term "business-safe" for this characteristic.
Introduction
The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [2] technique has been used with success in safety critical systems for cars, aircrafts and trains. We use cars, trains and aircrafts every day, without being terrified of the possibility that we will crash our car, the train will derail, or the aircraft will loose the power of one of its engines, or two or more aircrafts will collide. We know that if something unexpected happens, we or the transport controllers will be able to manage the transportation equipment in such a way that we will be able to control or avoid catastrophic events. This is because there has been built in hazard reduction and control solutions into safety critical equipment.
But there are seldom built in hazard reduction solutions into business critical software, mainly due to the fact that the application developers mostly are focused on methodologies, classes, and use cases, while clients and business owners worry about the requirements, and seldom think of the possibility that this new software will affect their marketable features, cash flow, or return on investment. Therefore, the stakeholders often neglect the safety aspect of the software. Introducing FMEA into the software development process will help the application developers to be able to increase the quality of the software in a systematic way by making them able to implement barriers. These barriers will reduce the possibilities that the software will fail or cause the users to loose information or money.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First we look at why we should do hazard analysis in software development, and introduce the FMEA technique. Thereafter we describe how the hazard analysis affect the software process. Thenr we describe how FMEA fits into software process improvement (SPI). We then describe how we recommend using FMEA in two steps during the development process, before showing two examples of how FMEA can be used. Finally we conclude the paper and discuss further work on this topic.
Why hazard analysis
In the Business Critical Software (BUCS) project we focus on hazard prevention rather than hazard detection and hazard reduction. It is easier and cheaper to identify hazards early during development, than doing it for instance during integration and testing. The result will be that the developers produce safer software, which in future will give the application developers more satisfied customers. Ignoring hazard prevention will get the customers into problems when using the software. Then it will be harder to fix, and more expensive to repair.
A system should be analyzed for business safety in the context of its environment and modes of operation to identify possible hazardous events [2] . A hazard is a state or set of conditions of a system or an object that, together with other conditions in the environment of the system or object, will lead to an accident. Using Failure and Effect Analysis (FMEA) will help us to reduce the product risk stemming from these accidents. While many software methodologies pay lip service to the need to monitor risk, there is little help offered in methodologies such as Rational Unified Process (RUP) and eXtreme Programming (XP) on how to reduce the product risk. In these frameworks, risk is only treated as a project risk.
Risk is defined as the product of an event's consequence and its probability of occurrence or as its hazard level (severity and likelihood of an occurrence) combined with 1) the likelihood of the hazard leading to an accident and 2) hazard exposure or duration. When a company is looking for a new software product, they deal with three factors; "What suppliers should we use?", "Which psychosocial influence will this new software product have in our organization?" and "Will the software product function in accordance to our requirements?" The supplier factor deals with uncertainty concerning the relationships of the potential supplier, like "Can we trust this supplier, do they produce the "best" product for us?", "Does this supplier stay "alive" both during the development time and during the maintenance time limit of our product?", "How financial strong is the supplier?", etc. Psychosocial factors deals with how this new product will affect our organization, like "Will this product improve our productivity and profitability?", "Will we be able to reduce / increase our staff?", etc. Product factors deals with "Does this product meet our requirements?", "How is the quality of this new software product as opposed to our existing product?", "What will happen if the product fails?" FMEA is a tool that can be used to consider the product factors.
Using FMEA will not make it cheaper to develop software, at least not in a short term perspective. Applying FMEA to increase the products' business-safety must be viewed as an investment. The return of investment will be software products with higher quality, which will lead to more business from existing customers and new business from new customers. In addition, we will have less need for fire-fighting. The workload will be larger in the beginning of the project. This bigger workload will reduce the rework later in the project, because now latent hazards are identified and the developers can use their new knowledge to limit, reduce or eliminate these hazards.
The results of the FMEA should be used as input to the further development and as input to tests that verify that the software is safe to use. Tests unambiguously communicate how things are supposed to work and provide feedback on whether the system actually works the way it is supposed to work. Tests also provide the scaffolding that allows developers to make changes throughout the development process. The FMEA results may be re-used in later projects, so the developers do not repeat implementing possible latent hazards in future products. In this way we accomplish a software process improvement.
Software Process Improvements (SPI)
The goal of software process improvement (SPI) is to increase the quality of the software by improving the development process. Quality can be defined as properties of products or services that satisfy the customers and users of the product. Software developers should build in integrity that balances functionality, usability, reliability and economical aspects in a way that satisfies the customer [3] . Using FMEA early in the software development will help the developers to prevent damage and accidents, so that they don't have to resist to a reactive response when damage or accident already has happened. The developers will thus avoid implementing latent hazards that might lead to catastrophic events, and thus, will increase the quality of the software. Introducing FMEA in software development process will lead to a more safe software product. Figure 1 shows both the RUP and the XP development process augmented with two FMEA activities. In principle, the software development process runs as usual, with the additional FMEA activities taking input from and affecting the architecture and coding activities, as well as giving output for tests on identified failure modes and their barriers. The same figure will, with possible minor modifications, apply to any other development processes.
As we see in the Figure 1 , FMEA should be used as a guiding and documenting tool when the developers has received the requirements from the customers and started to describe the requirements into use cases in RUP or user stories in XP. Already in this early stage of development the developers will be able to identify and document possible hazards and find solutions that will avoid or reduce the consequences of such hazards. The developers should use the FMEA analysis in cooperation with the customers, so that they together can find solutions that will avoid a possible damage.
The results from this functional FMEA will be new requirements that should be added to the original customer requirements. The developers should bring these new requirements into the design phase, where they describe abstract models based on the requirements. These models can be class diagrams, sequence diagrams, and other models which developers has sketched before they came up with the UML diagrams. These pre-UML diagrams models are used in agile modeling, where the developers start almost immediate to code, following the test-driven development approach.
In the detailed FMEA the developers analyze all the requirements, i.e. both the original requirements and the requirements from the functional FMEA, since the additional requirements could add new hazards into the software solution.
Introducing FMEA in today's software processes will result in more focus on "hazard scenarios", i.e. the developers will be more focused on "what can go wrong", and "what consequences will that have for ….", in contrast to today's focus on "happy scenarios", where the developers only focus on implementing the functional requirements from the customers. The results from the FMEA should be used as basis for tests, both developer and customer tests [3] .
The many faces of FMEA

Failure Method and Effect Analysis
During every development project some kind of safety evaluations is performed, but the results from these evaluations are seldom documented. Our solution at the early stages, when we have no design description, to analyze, is to use a simple Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Functional Failure Analysis (FHA) or Functional Failure Analysis (FHA) [4] . Later in the development process, when developers have made a design, for instance, described in UML, they can use FMEA to identify hazards that can arise, and what effects these hazards will have. FMEA gives guidelines on how to execute a systematic analysis of all components in a system -for object oriented development this can be all classes and their methods. The systematic approach makes the FMEA more effective than just a simple, unstructured analysis. The quality of the result of the FMEA process is, however, strongly dependent on the experience and knowledge of the participants. For this reason both developers and customer must participate in the analysis.
The procedure for the FMEA is as follows: Each method in a class is analyzed for possible failure modes. This is done by asking "how can this method fail and what happens if it does?" The developers write their answers to this question in the FMEA table -see table 1 . 
High
The weakness of the FMEA method is that each method is assessed one failure at a time. The developers thus miss the opportunity to identify and test sequences of several failures in a row. All failures and associated effects are described and collected in FMEA tables. The developers should sort the failure modes according to the severity classification and methods with major failures are considered for redesign or for insertion of a barrier to avert the danger [5] .
The FMEA table contains fields where the developers fill in the description of the effect of the failure, both locally -for the unit -and for the system. The developers shall, together with the customers, assess and insert the severity of each fault. We propose to use a simple ranking for severity -for instance high, medium or low. An alternative could be to use a combination of occurrence frequency, severity and detection [6] . From the FMEA table the developers will be able to start working with identifying actions and barriers that can be used to avoid or reduce the possibility of the hazards. These actions and barriers must not be in conflict with the originally requirements.
Simple arithmetic methods that only could give erroneous output because of overflow or underflow should not be analyzed, nor should the developers analyze methods concerning exception handling. Including these in the analysis will be time consuming and clutter the analysis, without adding any significant information. The developers should, however, be aware that using exceptions will introduce more code and increase risk. This again, can lead to new faults.
For each method relevant to the analysis, the developers have to identify the failure modes of the methods and possible failure causes. If the failure cause cannot be removed, it has to be dealt in another way, for instance by implementing a barrier. The barrier has to detect the failure and perform an action that will rectify or notify a controller function about this failure.
The most effective barriers are those inserted immediately after an error-prone step, such as data input, non-trivial mathematical or logical operations, and before data output. In many cases the detection is in the form of an assertion which, if not true, causes the program to enter an exception handling routine. Other detection provisions, typically found in system software (schedulers, operating systems, middleware) protect against incorrect message passing, exceeding time limits, and anomalous event sequences [7] .
The closer to the source of failure the barrier is inserted, the better is the chance of picking it up before it contaminates the rest of the system. This can, however, lead to a high number of barriers, and therefore a more complex system. Another possibility is to organize all classes into packages and implement barriers in supervising façade-class.
Effect propagation can be assessed by also analyzing classes that depend on methods from the class whose methods are being analyzed. This can be done by using information from the relevant sequence diagrams. The development team can go on to analyze the effects on the related classes, or they can decide to take action to prevent the failure modes from occurring in the local class, thereby removing any negative effects on related classes and their methods. When every method has been analyzed, or deemed exempt from analysis, the FMEA of the class methods is complete.
The identification of possible failure modes in a class will help the developers to choose among alternative solutions during implementation. By changing the system design by inserting a barrier, or by just rewriting some of the code, the developers may be able to eliminate the problem instead of inserting extra code for checking or control.
Functional FMEA
A functional FMEA is performed based on the requirements the developers receive from the customers and can be started when the developers have described the requirements as use cases in RUP or as user stories in XP, and they have chosen different architecture and design solutions. Later, when the developers have implemented and tested their code, they can perform a more detailed FMEA. The developers will then be able to identify possible failure modes both in the inception and elaboration phases of RUP and in the construction phase on the code that is used to implement the system. Some issues the FMEA should handle are shown in table 2: 
Detailed FMEA
During the functional FMEA, the information available was quite limited. The developers now have more available knowledge about the system to be built. This knowledge stems both from the previous functional FMEA and from all the other tasks done during the development process. The classes will have attributes, methods and relations to other classes and requirements for barriers are available from the functional FMEA. The detailed FMEA will further help the developers to describe how to make tests concerning the identified hazards and their barriers. This will give the developers knowledge about the classes' responsibilities and relationships to each other and they can thus produce:
• Barriers that can be used to reduce or eliminate hazards.
• Detailed tests that can be implemented and run as unit tests.
From a detailed FMEA the developers get information that will influence tests and already implemented code. There should preferably not be any changes to the architecture at this stage. The developers will have a better understanding and more information about the failure and the effects they will have.
The results of the detailed FMEA will be recommendations for concrete actions used to evade the identified failure modes. This will be in the form of suggestions for code alteration and barrier implementation, as well as tests concerning the suggested alterations and implementations.
Two small examples
Class fragment
A company needs a software system for handling customer orders. They contact a software company and from the requirements the developers come up with the class diagram shown in figure 2 . The developers decide that they need a database that contains information about the customers and the products of the company. The orders the company receive from their customers, will contain the number of items ordered for each product. The company has an order limit of each product.
Example of a functional FMEA
The following FMEA fragment analyzes the customer's credit rating. If the credit rating is too high, the customer can order for more than he should be allowed to. This might cause a loss for the company since they run the risk that the customer will not be able to pay. If the credit rating is set too low, the customer will not be allowed to order as much as he wants to and he will thus be less than satisfied. He might then start to buy the products from another company, and the company will loose a customer. If there is no credit rating at all, the company will not have any idea of whether they will get the money for their products. The FMEA table, partly filled out for our example, is shown below in Table 4 . Note that we can implement the barriers to this failure mode either as a manual control procedure or as a barrier in the code. If the barrier is implemented as code, this will be a critical implementation area and it should thus be analyzed further in a detailed FMEA.
Example of a detailed FMEA
After further development of the system, the developers can perform a detailed FMEA. They will now have more knowledge about the inner workings of the class, as well as how the class under consideration relates to other classes. The example in table 5 shows an FMEA concerning the potential event that the customer orders more than the company have in the stock. By using FMEA, the developers can identify the possible occurrences of this failure mode and identify possible barriers and barriers that will assure the business safety of the software product.
If the order is larger than the available stock, this should be discovered in the application, and a message should be sent to the user that the number of products ordered is too large. On the other hand, if the system's knowledge about current stock numbers is not updated, it can not send this information. The identified failure mode is that the system does not recognize that the ordered number of items is larger than the number of items in stock. The FMEA identifies some possible causes of this failure mode and what could be done to prevent it.
Conclusions and further work
By using the FMEA, the developers can identify possible failure modes in the system and include code that will prevent the problem or at least reduce its impact on system behavior. In this way, they can increase the probability that the system will behave in such a way that it will not cause losses to the user.
FMEA is a proactive tool that helps developers to become aware of possible failures, their affects on the sub-system and on the complete system. The strength of the FMEA is that it focuses on only one failure mode at time, and offers a documentation tool for developing more business safe software. The results from one FMEA could also be used in later projects, so the developers reduce later workload. In this way the developers will gain more knowledge, and make safer software products. The next step in the BUCS project is to run an industrial experiment to see if they find FMEA suitable for use in a real project and whether there are situations where the FMEA technique will break down. One of the interesting topics is to see how the results from an FMEA could be used in later projects. One other interesting topic is how easy it is for the developers to convert the results from the FMEA to tests, which will be used to identify the software system quality.
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